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INTRODUCTION
Professor Weiler's article, The Transformation of Europe, makes two impor-
tant contributions to legal and political scholarship: it helps us understand the
direction in which the European Community has developed, and its analysis
of the forces involved provides a basis for steering these developments into the
future.
Finding no fundamental mistakes in Weiler's analysis, I wish to focus
instead on the shades and nuances of Weiler's article. My Comment seeks to
introduce additional factors that support and augment his theory, especially as
it relates to the respective roles played by various political actors in the Europe-
an integration process, paying special attention to the judiciary. Because the
international society is so complex, it is virtually impossible for one author to
analyze all the relevant factors, which allows me to add pertinent arguments
to Professor Weiler's work.
I. (1958-1973): LEGAL AND POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE FOUNDATIONAL
PERIOD
Part I of Professor Weiler's article describes the development of the Europe-
an Economic Community (EEC) during its "Foundational Period," from 1958
to the mid-1970's. 1 During this period, a dichotomy between the evolution of
the European Community legal system and that of its political institutions began
to emerge. On the one hand, the European Court of Justice pushed the judicial
and legal structure in a supranational, federal direction. On the other hand, the
political structure, which initially created and employed a unifying supranational
treaty system, devolved in the direction of a loose confederation, leaving each
State's sovereignty almost wholly intact. Weiler mentions the decline of
Member States' political will, the influence of de Gaulle, and the reciprocal
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relationship between judicial and political developments as substantive factors
contributing to these two divergent trends.2 Weiler proposes that the judiciary's
movement in a federal direction would not have been politically possible if the
States had not felt sufficiently protected by their retained powers in the political
decisionmaking process.3
A. The Impact of Cultural Differences
Although I agree with Weiler's basic observation concerning the interre-
lationship of judicial and political developments, I believe he overlooks some-
what a more intangible factor in the integration process-the role played by
the people of Europe. In his introduction Professor Weiler writes that the
transformation of Europe has manifested itself through means ranging from the
"trivial and ridiculous to the important and sublime," labeling as "ridiculous"
items such as a Eurovision song contest.4 While at first sight this sort of
activity may seem nonsensical, Europeans may actually place more importance
on this type of symbolic exercise than one might think.
Europe is a heterogenous continent. The linguistic and cultural differences
which divide the nationals of the European States are much greater than those
which lie between the residents of the different states in North America. For
example, when a Dutchman speaks of Italians he often feels ill at ease. Italians
are shorter and darker; they speak a language completely incomprehensible to
the Dutchman. In addition, they take siestas, drink wine, and often practice a
different religion. Culturally, most Dutchmen-and probably most Danes, Ger-
mans, and Englishmen-feel closer to Americans and Canadians than to
Spaniards, Italians, and Greeks.
This feeling of being different, this looking upon fellow Europeans as
complete foreigners, affects the Common Market. For example, in the future
it will be necessary to harmonize the public welfare systems of the Member
States. Consequently, rich workers in Germany and the Netherlands will have
to subsidize unemployment benefits for the poor in Greece and Portugal. At
present I doubt whether the German and Dutch labor unions (let alone the
workers themselves) would be willing to make such a sacrifice. A sufficient
level of solidarity does not yet exist.
Before this can happen, all Europeans must get to know each other better.
By socializing informally at events such as song festivals, soccer matches, and
student exchanges, hopefully the Dutch citizen will learn to appreciate the
culture of his Italian neighbor. Taken individually, each of these activities may
seem trivial. When combined to form a careful long-term policy of international
2. Id. at notes 19-60 and accompanying text.
3. Id. at notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
4. See id. at 2403 & n.2.
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social contacts, however, they become essential to the European integration
process.
B. The Neglected Role of the National Bureaucracies
Moving into the political realm, I want to add a factor to Weiler's balance
of forces by looking to the impact of another actor in the integration process:
the national civil servant. This addition is necessary, because without the
support of the national bureaucracies, the European Community cannot achieve
intergovernmental cooperation. In the modern state, bureaucrats play a role
equally important to that of politicians and judges, particularly in highly
specialized fields. Bureaucrats use their technical skills to define the national
policy for their areas of expertise, which range from customs duties and
antitrust policy to manure disposal. They know the intricacies of their subject
areas and the national interests involved.
Those who run the national bureaucracies in Europe often find it productive
to travel to Brussels to discuss their specialties with equally competent foreign
colleagues. In many cases they accept the notion that standardized European
rules are needed, and they are willing to discuss them. They object, however,
when independent civil servants of the European Commission draft such rules
without considering their input, as was often the case during the early days of
the Community. National bureaucrats may rightly believe that they know their
subjects better than do the Commission's bureaucrats, and they will certainly
better understand those issues that affect their respective States' national
interests. Moreover, national civil servants lose their status and prestige when
the Community essentially takes over their work, and they understandably resist
such a transfer of power.
Bureaucratic resistance generated during the Foundational Period also partly
explains why, as Weiler notes, European legal systems moved powerfully ahead
toward integration while political groups favored preserving State sovereignty.
The reason is indeed apparent: the national bureaucracies became reluctant,
making their respective governments hesitant as well. Significantly, this govern-
mental reluctance originated in the executive branch.
Today the problem of bureaucratic resistance has been substantially alleviat-
ed by the addition of management committees. Management committees were
introduced during the 1960's to assist in Community agricultural decision-
making. The Council of Ministers constructed one management committee for
each agricultural product, and national civil servants specializing in that field
5. The Commission was established by the EEC Treaty, art. 157. Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The Commission makes policy proposals that are
submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval. These "supranational bureaucrats" employ a total staff
of over 10,000. For an overview of the political structure of the European Community., see generally T.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1988).
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joined to form each committee. Today the Commission often must consult
management committees, and in some cases it cannot make a decision without
their approval.
C. A Recalcitrant Executive Branch
The Council of Ministers must adopt every important Community decision,
and it is generally regarded as the most powerful political organ of the Commu-
nity. The Community Treaty requires that it be composed of the responsible
cabinet ministers from each of the Member States, hence the title.6 The inde-
pendence of the national executives allowed them to oppose integration even
when their position was not supported by other branches of the government or
the majority of the population. In the Netherlands, for example, all large politi-
cal parties remained faithful to the idea of supranationalism and European
integration, while the executive branch was considerably less enthusiastic. The
government often defended its less supranational approach by falsely claiming
that the other Member States forced it to accept this position. In other Member
States as well, parliamentary majorities consistently supported a supranational
approach against an approach which would leave the supreme powers with the
national governments.
D. The Judiciary's Role as the Driving Force Behind European Integration
In contrast to the executive branches of government, the national judiciaries
have shown strong support for unity in the European Community. In Western
Europe the judiciary is traditionally an important power of the state, and thus
it is especially significant that the judiciaries of the Member States have so
strongly advocated a supranational approach. 7 Without their support, the
European Court of Justice could not have assumed such an important role in
the Community. Because on many questions the Court of Justice acts only when
and if the State courts ask for a preliminary ruling, its most fundamental deci-
sions could not have been rendered without Member State courts' initiatives. 8
The State courts could have easily determined that such decisions were unnec-
essary or simply ignored Court of Justice rulings altogether, as the French
Conseil d'Etat did for a considerable amount of time with respect to preliminary
6. Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities of 8
April 1965, Official Journal of the European Communities No. 152, 13 July 1967.
7. See generally R. LECOURT, L'EUROPE DES JUGES (1976).
8. The domestic courts issue the majority of rulings applying Community law. When faced with
conflicting interpretations of Community law, the national courts defer to rulings issued by the European
Court of Justice. If the national courts feel that a question of Community law is unsettled, they may ask
the Court of Justice to issue a ruling. All questions referred to the Court of Justice must be answered; it
has no power of certiorari. See EEC Treaty, art. 177.
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rulings on the possible direct effect of Community directives.9 The loyal and
active cooperation of the State judiciaries constitutes one of the foundation
stones of powerful legal integration.
II. (1973-1980): JURISDICTIONAL MUTATION IN THE COMMUNITY
A. The Absorption of Domestic Law
Weiler illustrates the key role played by the Member State judiciaries in
Part II of his article, which examines the expansion of Community jurisdiction
during the second phase of its development, from 1973 to the mid-1980's. 10
Weiler defines one form of this "jurisdictional mutation" as "absorption," the
process by which national policies in an area outside the realm of Community
competence (i.e. education) are "absorbed," or overridden, when they conflict
with Community law." Although the process of absorption ultimately diluted
the independence and power of the Member State judiciaries, through that
process the State courts actually contributed significantly to the substance of
Community law, as in the field of human rights. Without pressure from the
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the European Court
of Justice might not have developed Community human rights protection
adequately.
The absorption theory can be analyzed through a line of cases pertaining
to human rights decided by the German Constitutional Court. The German
constitution enumerates a number of fundamental human rights which must be
respected by all German authorities. In Solange I the German Constitutional
Court held that when Community law infringed on fundamental human rights
guaranteed by the German constitution, German human rights would prevail.
The court held that the German government would not enforce such EEC laws
until the Community adequately protected fundamental human rights. 2 This
ruling allowed the German Constitutional Court to review Community acts to
determine their conformity with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
German constitution, and possibly to block their absorption into the national
law.
9. See Judgment of Dec. 22, 1978, Conseil d'Etat, Fr., 1978 Rescueil Sirey [D.P. III] 524, [1980] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 543 (Minister of the Interior v. Cohn-Bendit). In this case the French Supreme Administra-
tive Court, the Conseil d'Etat, held that Community directives, unlike regulations, do not have "direct effect"
in domestic law. This ruling directly contravened a Court of Justice decision establishing that such directives
may have direct effects. The Conseil d'Etat took a different stance, however, in another case, Nicolo,
however, where it stated (in dicta) that international law could set aside more recent French legislation. See
Judgment of Oct. 20, 1989, Conseil d'Etat, Fr., 1989 D.P. 111190.
10. See Weiler, supra note 1, at 2431-53.
11. See id. at 2438-41.
12. Judgment of May 29, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 37 Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfGE] 271, [19741 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 540 (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel) [Solange I].
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The Casagrande case, 3 quoted by Weiler, indicates a domestic court trend
in the opposite direction. In this case it was argued that because education is
a domestic issue, Community decisions in the education field could not be
effective in Germany. The German judiciary rejected this proposition and thus
permitted absorption, which it had blocked in Solange L None of the other
Member State supreme courts followed the reasoning in Solange I, and twelve
years later in Solange H114 the German Constitutional Court found that the
Community's own system of protecting fundamental human rights had matured
to a level where it adequately protected the fundamental human rights guaran-
teed by the German constitution. The German Constitutional Court would no
longer review Community acts, provided that the Community's own protection
of human rights did not deteriorate. All European judiciaries now accept
European Court of Justice decisions governing conflicts between Community
law and Member State law. That acceptance constitutes the fundamental
strength of the Community system.
B. Incorporation and the Question of Human Rights
Professor Weiler's discussion of incorporation 15 as a form of jurisdictional
expansion is not as persuasive as that of absorption. Weiler overstates the
effects of this phenomenon, although it does raise significant issues. Incorpora-
tion encompasses the idea that all Community law becomes a part of the
domestic law of the Member States, where it is applied and executed like any
other statute. For most Member States, incorporation of international treaties
is a normal phenomenon which causes no problems. t6 In some Member States,
however, the process of harmonizing treaties and domestic law requires a
separate, time-consuming legislative procedure. To prevent discrepancies and
delays, the European Court of Justice ruled in Van Gend & Loos that the
Community legal order is a different entity than international treaty law, thereby
freeing it from the constraints such treaty law encounters in dualist systems. 7
On the basis of Van Gend & Loos, and regardless of a Member State's position
on the incorporation of international law, Community law is directly and fully
incorporated into every Member's domestic legal order.
13. Case 9/74, Donato Casagrande v. Landeshaputstadt Munchen, 1974 E.C.R. 773.
14. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, Bunderverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L. Rep. 225 (Re the Application of Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft) [Solange Ill.
15. See Weiler, supra note I, at 2441-42 & nn.106-09.
16. Countries such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands employ a monist system for the interpretation
of treaties, whereby the treaty supersedes all provisions of domestic law. In countries employing some form
of a dualist system, as in Germany and Italy, international treaties do not automatically override those
domestic laws which are passed after the treaty is enacted. In these countries, special exceptions have been
created for Community treaties.
17. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration), 1963 E.C.R. I [Van Gend &
Loos].
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However, with respect to fundamental human rights, the situation is some-
what different. As Weiler notes, Community law does not contain a bill of
rights, and it is unclear whether and to what extent the Community's powers
are limited by national and international documents on human rights. However,
this issue is not as serious as it may seem, because it concerns the application
of human rights provisions only to the Community organization itself. The
individual Member States are all bound by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), t8 a treaty
which binds twenty-two of the European States. This convention created its own
organs for supervision, the European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights. Individuals file complaints against their
national governments with the Commission; the Court renders judgments.
Citizens may initiate suits whenever they feel that their government has in-
fringed any of their enumerated rights, although they must first exhaust all
domestic remedies.
The ECHR has been incorporated into the domestic legal orders of most
European States, which means that plaintiffs can invoke it before their national
courts. In the United Kingdom and in the Scandinavian countries one cannot
invoke the Convention (or any other treaty, except the Community treaties) in
a domestic court. There, one must invoke parallel domestic rights-to the extent
that they exist-before one may lodge a complaint with the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights. No national "Bill of Rights" is identical to the ECHR;
therefore, the domestic courts themselves cannot supervise the application of
the Convention. Consequently, plaintiffs file more complaints with the Commis-
sion. This system is generally regarded as inefficient and a handicap for the
countries that employ it.' 9 Recently, Norway,20 Denmark,21 and to a lesser
extent the United Kingdom,22 have seriously studied the possibility of incorpo-
rating the Convention as a whole into their domestic legal orders.
The European Community is not bound by the European Convention on
Human Rights. This means that Community acts cannot be challenged before
the organs created by the Convention. The gap thus created is not large in
practice, as the Community judiciary will annul any Community act which
infringes general principles of law, which normally include human rights.
18. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953).
19. See generally A. DRZEMCZE\WSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1983). Professor Drzemczewski stresses the need for greater harmonization and
uniform application of ECHR law. Id. at 330-41. He ultimately concludes that the solution to this problem
lies with a system whereby the Court of Human Rights would issue preliminary rulings on questions referred
to it by the domestic courts, "with the pre-condition of domestic incorporation of the Convention." Id. at
336.
20. Id. at 132-35.
21. See Gulman, Denmark, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 31-33 (1987).
22. See Higgins, United Kingdom, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW, supra note 21, at
130; see also DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 19, at 186-87.
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Nonetheless, a theoretical gap exists, which could be closed in either of two
ways: (1) the Community could adhere to the European Convention; or (2) the
Community could adopt its own "Bill of Rights." Adhering to the European
Convention is the preferable solution. Although the alternative would ensure
protection of human rights in the twelve Member States, it would not reach the
other countries that are parties to the ECHR. Both for the sake of human rights
and for the sake of Europe, it would be a pity if, in the area of human rights,
the continent would thus be divided along the same lines as those drawn for
economic purposes, creating special protections for a Europe of twelve Com-
munity Members and excluding the rest.
C. Expansion of Implied Powers in the EEC
Professor Weiler identifies expansion as the most radical form of juris-
dictional mutation enlarging Community powers. Weiler describes expansion
as the broad exercise of the implied powers of the Community, largely derived
through Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, a European "necessary and proper
clause." Article 235 grants powers to the Community whenever this is "neces-
sary to attain one of its objectives."' I agree with Weiler's contention that
Article 235 opened the door for the "expansion" of Community powers.2
4
1. The Erosion of Executive Resistance
Weiler explains the lack of resistance to Community expansion by focusing
on the Member States' "near total control" of the Community process: "[T]he
EEC appeared more as an instrument in the hands of the governments rather
than as a usurping power."' The executive branch of the national govern-
ments, usually the strongest opponent of Community expansion, began to offer
less resistance. With the exception of Denmark, the parliaments of the various
Member States favored a liberal reading of Article 235, and European academ-
ics commenting upon developments in the EEC typically supported expansion
as well. Their encouraging comments may have stimulated activism in the
Court. Therefore, once the Member State executives embraced the application
of Article 235, little substantial resistance remained.
2. The Dangers of Overexpansion
Weiler concludes his section on the evolution of Community jurisdiction
by warning that such expansion does have natural limits. He could be read to
suggest here that interest groups should be more fully incorporated into the
23. EEC Treaty, art. 235.
24. See Weiler, supra note 1, at nn.116-21 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 2448.
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political process. 6 The Economic and Social Committee was established to
involve interest groups in the Community's decisionmaking process; 27 howev-
er, it never flourished, and its opinions receive little attention.
Even more significantly, Weiler warns that Member State judiciaries may
diminish or even terminate their support if the Community aggressively expands
into a field which they consider their domain.' This Comment has argued that
the loyal support of the Member State judiciaries forms the backbone of the
Community legal order and provides the driving force behind European integra-
tion. To date I see no weakening of this backbone in the development of the
Community, yet I realize that under pressure even backbones may break.
Although it seems highly unlikely, if the Member State judiciaries do reach
critical breaking point and become hostile opponents of European integration,
I believe that the process could break down entirely.
I1. 1992 AND BEYOND
Part III of Weiler's article explores more recent developments in the EEC
and attempts to look beyond the celebrated 1992 deadline for economic integra-
tion. Since Part III concerns the future, it necessarily contains speculative
submissions, which, of course, may or may not prove true.
A. The Impact of the Single European Act
Weiler correctly remarks that, on its face, the Single European Act (SEA)29
largely fails to contribute substantially to the development of the common
market.30 Its goal of achieving a single market is not a radical one; the EEC
Treaty, adopted over twenty years earlier, advocates this same idea. Overall,
however, I believe he underestimates the potential effects of the SEA.
The SEA's greatest impact was in demonstrating the political will to achieve
a unified market by the end of 1992, thereby stimulating formerly recalcitrant
state administrations to cooperate. Also, various industries began to plan for
the larger market and pressure their national governments to do likewise. The
pressure exerted by industry has been and probably will be more effective in
developing a single market than the actual adoption of the SEA, suggesting that
developments depend largely on the political climate rather than the actual text
of political documents. These more informal types of pressures seem to be more
effective in persuading government officials to act. Although we cannot foresee
26. Id. at 2452-53.
27. EEC Treaty, arts. 193-198.
28. Weiler, supra note 1, at 2451-52.
29. Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986 [hereinafter SEA].
30. Weiler, supra note 1, at nn. 134-39 and accompanying text.
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the direction of future political developments, it seems likely that economic
forces will continue to drive the Member States closer together.
B. Article lOa and an End to the Unanimity Requirement
Integration has been accompanied by the abandonment of many of the
political safeguards which Weiler asserts made expansion of Community powers
possible. Article 18 of the SEA amends Article 100 of the EEC Treaty; the new
Article 100a provides for weighted majority voting in the Council of Ministers,
where unanimity was formerly required.3 No Member State now possesses
a veto power over the others.
1. The Luxembourg Accord
In my opinion, Weiler overestimates the importance of another act, the
Luxembourg Accord,32 as it relates to preserving a unanimity voting require-
ment. The Luxembourg Accord resulted from the 1965 Community crisis,
during which France boycotted Council sessions. "Accord" is actually a misno-
mer, since such an accord never really existed, at least not with respect to
official voting procedures. France proposed that when an issue before the
Council of Ministers concerned the "vital interests" of a Member State, discus-
sions should continue until unanimity was reached. The other Member States,
however, rejected the vital interests exception to the majority voting rule.33
Since no Member State wanted to risk another crisis, the Council adopted the
practice of never taking a vote once a State declared that a particular issue
concerned its so-called vital interests. New Member States supported the French
position; and, thus, it became understood that, when the Community debated
highly critical issues, decisionmaking should be by unanimity. This practice
naturally encouraged cooperation among the States, but it did not eliminate the
possibility that majority voting could take place, even when vital interests were
at stake. Since the Member States never formally adopted a Luxembourg
Accord, it would be impossible for a majority of the Member States to "repeal"
it, as Weiler suggests. 34
2. Exemptions to Article lOOa
31. The Council of Ministers shall adopt actions "which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market" by a "qualified majority." EEC Treaty, art. 100a.
32. Luxembourg Accord, in 1966 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrrY 8 (No. 3)
(issued on Jan. 29, 1966), reprinted in SWEET & MAXWELL's EUROPEAN COMiUNITY TREATIES 234-35
(1972).
33. Id.
34. Weiler, supra note 1, at 2459. Weiler does, however, state correctly that Article 100a has substan-
tially weakened the practical effects of the Luxembourg Accord.
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I also believe that the exemptions contained in Article 100a which allow
Member States to deviate from majority voting procedures do not present the
difficulties that Weiler anticipates. Article 100a (5) allows Member States to
adopt national "safeguard" measures for noneconomic reasons, such as health
and safety, articulated in Article 36 of the EEC Treaty.
Achieving larger markets is of such importance to the whole Community
that the Member States will strive diligently to reach agreement on rules
applicable to those markets. Therefore it is highly unlikely that the Council
would adopt a directive against the wishes of the large Member States. It is the
smaller countries, such as Denmark and Greece, which have used the unanimity
rule to preclude further harmonization. The Common Market would not suffer
great losses if the harmonized rules did not extend to these smaller States, but
the objecting countries themselves would suffer. While it is true that recalcitrant
nations could use, for example, different preservatives in foodstuffs, no other
Community country would be permitted to import them, which would compel
producers in small countries to restrict distribution to their home markets. This
is not likely to be an attractive proposition.
C. The Problem of Noncompliance
Professor Weiler's theory that the Member States' level of noncompliance
with Community law will rise to compensate for increased Community powers
also seems somewhat unfounded. I doubt whether a "strategy of Exit" accord-
ing to which Member States selectively apply their Community obligations will
emerge.35
Article 169 of the EEC Treaty allows the Commission to bring a Member
State before the Court of Justice if it does not comply with Community law.
Most Court decisions under Article 169 have held against Italy and Belgium,
yet both of these States remain loyal to the Community. Their lack of obedience
with Community law stems from their inability rather than their unwillingness
to comply. Because of its complicated constitutional structure, the Italian
government is often unable to consider necessary domestic measures before the
EC deadlines expire. Belgium recently redivided powers between the regions
and the central government, and it remains unclear which government retains
responsibility for implementing Community law. The result may be that -no
action will be taken at all.
Still, perhaps some kind of sanction attached to Article 171,36 such as a
fine on the State concerned, would prompt the Member States to fulfill their
obligations to execute Court judgments. In practice, a strong sanction already
exists within those national legal orders, such as the Netherlands, that permit
35. See id. at nn.178-79 and accompanying text.
36. EEC Treaty, art. 171, requires Member States to comply with rulings issued by the European Court
of Justice.
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individuals to sue the government for damages in cases where the government
has failed to execute Community obligations.
CONCLUSION
I share Weiler's opinion that the importance of 1992 is the fascinating
mobilization of very wide sections of general public opinion behind the "new"
Europe. It is indeed remarkable that, far more than all prior projects, 1992 has
been accepted by the public as the date after which internal borders will
disappear. Public confidence in the achievement is so great that it will be
difficult for the national governments to maintain barriers after the end of 1992.
The culture of the market as a basis for a free Europe was obviously
strongly stimulated by the collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Eu-
rope. More than ever before, the free market is now accepted as the true basis
for a Western democracy.
Weiler is also correct in his conclusion that Europe should not try to
become a superstate, but that it must develop into a Community where powers
are shared among the local, the national, and the European levels. The vast
majority of European public opinion shares this view. It may prove difficult,
however, to find a proper division of competences, and in particular to find the
authority for dividing the competences among the various political actors, all
of whom vie for power. If subsequent evolution reflects at all the developments
of the past, I predict that the European Court of Justice will play the key role.
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